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Abstract
Background: Gaming is a potentially dysfunctional consequence of performance measurement and management 
systems in the health sector and more generally. In 2009, the New Zealand government initiated a Shorter Stays in 
Emergency Department (SSED) target in which 95% of patients would be admitted, discharged or transferred from an 
emergency department (ED) within 6 hours. The implementation of similar targets in England led to well-documented 
practices of gaming. Our research into ED target implementation sought to answer how and why gaming varies over time 
and between organisations. 
Methods: We developed a mixed-methods approach. Four organisation case study sites were selected. ED lengths of stay 
(ED LOS) were collected over a 6-year period (2007-2012) from all sites and indicators of target gaming were developed. 
Two rounds of surveys with managers and clinicians were conducted. Interviews (n = 68) were conducted with clinicians 
and managers in EDs and the wider hospital in two phases across all sites. The interview data was used to develop 
explanations of the patterns of variation across time and across sites detected in the ED LOS data.
Results: Our research established that gaming behaviour – in the form of ‘clock-stopping’ and decanting patients to 
short-stay units (SSUs) or observation beds to avoid target breaches – was common across all 4 case study sites. The 
opportunity to game was due to the absence of independent verification of ED LOS data. Gaming increased significantly 
over time (2009-2012) as the means to game became more available, usually through the addition or expansion of 
short-stay facilities attached to EDs. Gaming varied between sites, but those with the highest levels of gaming differed 
substantially in terms of organisational dynamics and motives. In each case, however, high levels of gaming could be 
attributed to the strategies of senior management more than to the individual motivations of frontline staff.
Conclusion: Gaming of New Zealand’s ED target increased after the real benefits (in terms of process improvement) 
of the target were achieved. Gaming of ED targets could be minimised by eliminating opportunities to game through 
independent verification, or by monitoring and limiting the means and motivations to game.
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Implications for policy makers
• If the design of emergency department (ED) targets allows opportunities for gaming, such opportunities will be exploited by implementing 
organisations.
• Organisations become more adept at gaming an ED target the longer that it is in place.
• The strategies of senior managers in organisation may be a far more important factor shaping motivation to game than the moral attributes of 
individual clinicians and front-line staff.
• Policy-makers need to pay closer attention to detecting and responding to gaming of ED targets over time, if targets are to retain their integrity 
and effectiveness.
Implications for the public
Governments often use performance targets for health sector organisations as a way of holding organisations accountable. However, staff in 
organisations can ‘game’ targets, making performance appear better when it is not. Our research demonstrated that New Zealand hospitals engaged 
in gaming the Shorter Stays in emergency departments (EDs) target in the three years after the government introduced it in 2009. Performance 
targets often lose their capacity to reflect actual performance as health services develop and evolve. When there is no system set up for independent 
verification of ED waiting time figures, the broader public need to be aware of the potential for gaming, and be prepared to question the performance 
data, particularly when target achievement is linked to the electoral strategies of governing parties. In this way, citizens can help ensure that 
governments and health sector organisations minimise practices that ‘hit the target but miss the point.’
Key Messages 
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Background
Gaming has long been identified as a potentially dysfunctional 
consequence of performance measurement and management 
systems in the health sector and more generally.1-3 There is 
much discussion about why gaming occurs, and what can be 
done to minimise and/or prevent it. However, few researchers 
have explicitly addressed the question of how and why gaming 
varies between organisations subject to the same performance 
regime. Asking such a question is important because it can 
help researchers and practitioners understand the dynamics 
of gaming within a larger range of implementation contexts, 
and can assist in developing strategies aimed at minimising 
gaming, and making judgements about the trade-offs between 
the benefits and problems associated with performance 
measurement and management regimes.
In this article, we develop a mixed-methods research 
approach to the analysis of 4 health organisation case sites 
over a 6-year period to determine the extent of gaming 
a mandatory national time target for the completion of 
emergency department (ED) care in New Zealand, and 
explain how gaming varied over time and place. 
Gaming and Variation
What Is Gaming?
According to Kelman and Friedman, gaming is ‘making 
performance on the measured performance dimension 
appear better when it is not.’4 This definition is restricted 
to identifying behaviour. Mannion and Braithwaite fold 
the motivation for such behaviour into their definition of 
‘altering of behaviour or reporting in order to obtain strategic 
advantage.’5 Zoe Radnor emphasises consequences in defining 
gaming as the ‘creation of both formal and informal activities 
which allow a target or regulated deliverable to be met when 
the result leads to unintended consequences on the external 
or internal service delivery.’6 
Definitions of gaming are difficult to clearly separate from 
broader discussions of cheating, or from other potentially 
adverse consequences of performance measurement and 
management, characterised as ‘hitting the target but missing 
the point.’ Many authors suggest a continuum between 
gaming and cheating – suggesting that ‘falsification’ is an 
example of cheating, whereas ‘creative classification’ is 
gaming.3,6 Hitting the target but missing the point covers a 
much wider range of phenomena, including ratchet effects, 
effort substitution and myopia.3 These can be considered 
as possible emergent behaviours that arise from regimes of 
performance measurement. For our purposes, we situate 
gaming within this broader category of ‘hitting the target but 
missing the point,’ and regard cheating (data falsification) as 
one possible manifestation of gaming.
Clearly the fact that some definitions identify problematic 
consequences points to widespread concerns about gaming 
behaviour, including ‘breach of trust,’5 undermining of the 
integrity of performance management systems,4 and even 
possibly concealing practices that are hazardous and endanger 
patients and staff.7
The New Zealand Emergency Department Target
The issue of ED crowding became a prominent health policy 
issue in the first decade of the 20-first century in many 
countries.8 In 2009, the New Zealand government initiated a 
Shorter Stays in Emergency Department (SSED) target which 
stipulated that 95% of patients would be admitted, discharged 
or transferred from an ED within 6 hours in all District 
Health Boards (DHBs).9 DHBs are the publicly-funded 
provider organisations responsible for hospital services. The 
SSED target was part of a wider regime of 6 health targets.10 
From 2009 to 2017, each of the 20 DHBs reported on their 
target performance every three months, and the Ministry 
of Health publicised their performance through local 
newspapers and its website. After a change of government in 
2017, public reporting of the target ceased although it was still 
a requirement for DHBs to monitor their performance against 
the measure.
There were many resemblances to the English regime of 
targets implemented in the early 2000s. The English accident 
and emergency (A&E) target was part of a more elaborate 
system of reward and punishment using a combination of 
reputational ratings and financial incentives and penalties.11-13 
Hospitals were strongly motivated by these sticks and 
carrots.14 In the English ED target senior managers suffered 
reputational and financial consequences for poor target 
performance.3 By contrast, in New Zealand top down 
pressure was exerted informally by the Minister of Health to 
DHB chief executives when performance against the target 
was deemed to be unsatisfactory.10 Nevertheless, the English 
experience is instructive for analysing the implementation of 
the New Zealand target, particularly as it helps identify the 
range of possible gaming behaviours that are associated with 
such a target.
Why Might Gaming the ED Target Vary Between Organisations 
and Over Time
In exploring reasons for gaming, we start from the contention 
that context matters in the implementation of performance 
management regimes.15-17 In publicly funded health systems 
with many local organisational sites or units, we can expect 
specific instruments of performance management to be 
applied in differing ways, with differing consequences 
across different places or times. However, academic research 
focusing on the nature of contextual variation in gaming is 
rare.18
Motives, Opportunities and Means
Gaming is difficult to research because it is usually hidden.19 
Consequently, some researchers deploy terminology likening 
gaming to criminal or illegal activity – particularly the 
language of ‘motive and opportunity.’1,3 These are features 
that may vary significantly between implementation sites as 
different organisations make sense of the target in different 
ways.
Motives
One possible source of variation is that the problem or 
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condition that is subject to performance management may 
be objectively more problematic for some organisations 
than others. Therefore, the motivation to game may be 
stronger where the problem is more serious. Consequently, 
organisations starting with low levels of performance may be 
more likely to engage in gaming.14 
One strand of literature on gaming focuses on moral 
attributes of managers and frontline staff. Gwyn Bevan, for 
example, adopted Julian Le Grand’s language of ‘knights’ and 
‘knaves,’20,21 which suggests that knights – motivated by more 
intrinsic factors – may be less inclined to manipulate data 
than knaves who are more responsive to extrinsic incentives.22 
Variation in gaming could possibly be explained by different 
distributions of knightly and knavish behaviours across 
different implementation sites.
Other authors focus more on organisational dynamics and 
the relationships between frontline staff, senior management 
and external agencies. When the weight of implementation is 
directed downwards to the clinical and clerical staff, street-
level bureaucrats may decide to game as part of an overall 
coping strategy.23,24 Organisational approaches that involve 
‘pushing the pressure down’ may stimulate gaming because 
frontline staff may have few other options to meet performance 
measurement goals.19 Frontline staff may fabricate data 
because they do not believe the regime is legitimate (and 
experience distance from senior management), and/or have 
different values than their managers.25 Similarly, gaming may 
also be a product of political pressure, particularly when the 
local implementers did not see the policy as being aligned 
with the problem it was trying to address.26 Research on 
English A&E target implementation suggested that hospitals 
where frontline clinicians bore the weight of implementation 
were more prone to gaming, in contrast to those adopting a 
whole-of-hospital approach.27
Gaming behaviours can also be directly initiated, organised 
and designed by senior management.28 In such cases, frontline 
gaming behaviour reflects strategies initiated at senior levels, 
rather than being simply a reactive type of behaviour. These 
strategic approaches by senior management may reflect 
their own judgements of the legitimacy of the performance 
management regime, and are likely to be shaped by internal 
organisational factors such as culture and history.29
Opportunities
Opportunities are the second component of the criminal 
analogy. Some organisations may have greater opportunities 
to fabricate data, or engage in creative classification than 
others. This may be due to varying exposure to independent 
audit, or to whether or not organisations adopt internal 
systems that are capable of detecting gaming and cheating.1 
A classic example of exploiting gaming opportunities was 
practice of ‘ambulance ramping’ (keeping arriving patients 
in ambulances to delay the clock starting) that was common 
in England.11 Some data falsification at A&E entry and exit 
points was also revealed by independent audits of length of 
stay.30-32 Control over the ‘exit’ time meant that staff could 
record that a patient had been seen, treated, admitted or 
discharged, when they were still in the A&E awaiting some 
activity. This behaviour is referred to as ‘clock-stopping.’
Means 
Building on the criminal analogy, other performance 
management researchers have made the distinction between 
‘means’ and ‘opportunities’18 – the analogy being that one 
might have the opportunity to commit a murder, but not 
have access to a murder weapon. In the context of ED target 
implementation, means refers to places where patients at risk 
of breaching the target can be ‘decanted.’ As the majority of 
patients that stay longer in EDs are admitted to inpatient 
wards, these wards are one obvious destination for decanting. 
However, the lack of available beds in these wards is often 
the primary cause of ED crowding, so this option may not 
be available for organisations. Another ‘decant’ option is 
that of the short-stay unit (SSU) where patients are not 
(yet) admitted, but are held for further observation. Locker 
and Mason30 identified SSUs as a key way in which English 
hospitals managed their target. SSUs have become standard 
features of New Zealand hospitals since the mid-2000s. 
Research Question(s) and Methods
The central research questions addressed in this paper are:
1.	 Was New Zealand’s ED target gamed?
2.	 To what extent did gaming the New Zealand’s ED target 
vary between organisations and over time?
3.	 How can this variation be explained in terms of motives, 
opportunities and means to game?
To answer these questions, we adopted a mixed-methods 
approach built on comparative case studies. A mixed-methods 
approach is most appropriate when the policy impact of 
interest can be meaningfully measured.33 This mixed-
methods approach to researching gaming can avoid some 
pitfalls inherent in approaches that only adopt qualitative or 
quantitative approaches. 
We chose a case study approach as the most appropriate way 
to underpin a mixed-methods approach.34 This comparative 
approach has also been productively applied in health services 
research.35,36 Our guiding approach to data collection, analysis 
and interpretation was to use the ED lengths of stay (ED LOS) 
data to build a picture of what and how much gaming-related 
behaviour occurred over time at each case site (Questions 1 
and 2), and then apply a secondary analysis of a qualitative 
(interview) dataset to help explain why the extent of gaming 
differed across time and place (Question 3). These questions 
required different types of data that, taken together, could 
present a more comprehensive understanding of gaming and 
its variation.37
Case Study Selection
At the outset of our research in 2010, four case study hospital 
sites chosen were predominantly larger, urban and regional 
hospitals where problems of ED crowding were more likely 
to manifest.34 We also chose cases that varied in terms of 
the ED LOS target measure prior to the beginning of policy 
implementation in mid-2009. The 4 case study hospitals 
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accounted for over a quarter of total ED presentations in 
New Zealand over the 2006-2012 period.38 We also gathered 
contextual data on the cost of implementing the target using 
a survey administered to all hospitals in New Zealand in 2011 
and 2012.34,39 Key features of contextual variation between 
implementation sites are summarised in Table 1.
Emergency Department Length of Stay Data
Our answers to the first two research questions are based on 
extensive data on ED LOS was collected over a 6-year period 
(2007-2012) so that the period of target implementation 
(2009-2012) could be understood in the context of, and 
compared with pre-target figures.34 The quantitative analysis 
was conducted between 2014 and 2016 after a thorough 
process of data cleaning to ensure consistency across sites.
From the data on reported ED LOS distributions, there 
are some established indicators that constitute evidence of 
gaming, and allow us to track variation between case sites and 
over time.30-32 We used three indicators of gaming to compare 
the 4 sites. 
Firstly, we measured ‘terminal digit preference bias’ 
(TDPB). For this indicator we analysed the subset of patients 
with a recorded ED LOS between 360 and 369 minutes, and 
measured the percentage of these patients in which the last 
digit was ‘0’ (ie, had a recorded length of stay of 360 minutes). 
We would expect this figure would be very close to 10%, as 
would also be expected for all other terminal digits (1-9). 
Gaming is indicated when the percentage of terminal digits 
recorded as ‘0’ significantly exceeds 10% for the increment 
that includes the target. The higher the percentage of ‘0’s, the 
higher the level of gaming.
Our second measure is the extent of ‘spikes’ in the 
distribution of ED wait times around the target of LOS. Locker 
and Mason identified this phenomenon in English LOS data 
in the subcategory of patients that were admitted to hospital.40 
Locker and Mason showed spikes graphically, but we 
have developed a way of measuring them. To develop this 
indicator, LOS data for the subcategory of ED patients that 
were admitted to inpatient wards was divided into equal time 
increments of 15 minutes, and the proportion of patients 
with recorded waiting times within each increment is plotted 
against the y-axis as a percentage of all presentations. The 
height of the spike equals a-[(b+c)/2], where a is the percentage 
of all admitted patients with an ED LOS between 346 and 360 
minutes (the increment that includes the ED target), b is the 
percentage of admitted patients with a 331-345 minute LOS 
(the pre-target increment), and c is the percentage for 361 to 
375 minutes (the post-target increment). For example, if the 
target increment is 9%, the pre-target increment is 4%, and 
the post target increment is 2%, the spike height is 6.
This measure is a useful, but more indirect indicator of 
gaming. First, spikes indicate the size of the potential pool for 
the inaccurate recording of the end of the ED visit that we 
see in TDPB figures. Second, the height of the spike can also 
indicate the pool of potential opportunities to decant patients 
to other destinations (particularly SSUs) in order to meet the 
target, rather than for clear clinical reasons. 
Our third indicator of gaming is the percentage of patients 
recorded as having a very short (0-15 minute) length of 
stay in ED. This indicator emerged from our analysis of the 
ED LOS patterns. This spike indicates the extent to which 
patients referred to ED by their general practitioner were 
immediately transferred to an SSU. While this is a legitimate 
clinical practice, we classify it as gaming in the context of the 
ED target because these patients should not be counted as ED 
presentations, as they are not cared for by ED staff, and do not 
occupy space in the ED.
Case Study Interview Data
We then turned to a source of qualitative data in order to 
help explain the patterns identified in the ED LOS data. One 
author (LC) had conducted 68 face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews about the implementation of the ED target as part 
of PhD research into processes of implementation of the 
ED target. This researcher had a background in ED nursing 
and health service management. Interviewees were nursing, 
medical and allied health clinicians, and clinical and non-
clinical managers in the hospital and DHB organisations (see 
Table 2). Participants were recruited by posting invitations on 
DHB intranets, and by identifying prospective interviewees 
with the assistance of key contacts at each site. Interview data 
were collected in two rounds in early 2011 (47 interviews) 
and mid-2012 (21 interviews), with thirteen participants 
interviewed in both rounds.
The interviewer did not ask specific questions about 
gaming during the interviews. This data was collected before 
we developed our analysis of ED length-of-stay gaming 
indicators. Nevertheless, the interviews were directly relevant, 
particularly as they provided a rich source of information 
about the different organisational contexts and conditions in 
which implementation of the ED target transpired. In order 
to find relevant information we analysed a summary of the 
interview findings prepared by the interviewer in 2014, and in 
2017 we conducted text searches of the interview transcripts 
Table 1. Shorter Stays in ED Case Study Hospital Site Characteristics
District Population 
Size (2013)
Performance on Target Measure Prior to Implementation 
(April-June 2009) (Ministry of Health Figures)
Hospital 1 100-200 000 Small urban centre 80.7%
Hospital 2 >400 000 Large urban centre 78.7%
Hospital 3 200-400 000 Medium-sized urban centre serving regional population 62.6%
Hospital 4 >400 000 Large urban centre 55.5%
Abbreviation: ED, emergency department.
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for particular terms and phrases that could refer to gaming. 
These terms included ‘clock-stopping,’ ‘gaming,’ and ‘fudging.’ 
As such, all information about gaming was volunteered in the 
context of the wider interview. 
Results
Overview of Change in ED LOS Data Over Time
Table 3 provides some background to our findings on gaming 
by summarising key features of ED target implementation in 
the case study sites reported in previous research.
Evidence of Gaming From ED LOS Data
Figure 1 shows that TDPB appeared after the 2009 introduction 
of the ED target in all case study sites with the exception of H2 
which initiated its own 6-hour target in 2008.
H1 shows the largest and steepest increase in TDPB after 
the introduction of the target in 2009. H2 demonstrates a 
much ‘flatter’ increase, albeit one that began earlier, peaking 
at 24% in 2011. H3 and H4 both show small increases in 
TDPB before 2011, after which the rate rises more steeply, 
particularly for H4.
Figure 2 shows the 346-360 minute spikes from 2009 to 2012 
for the case study hospitals. In 2009 there are no discernible 
spikes in any of the hospitals apart from a small one in H2. By 
2012 all sites had demonstrated spikes for the 346-360 minute 
interval – H2, H3, and H4 each had spikes of around 4% and 
the figure for H1 was over 8%. 
The height of the spikes increases over the 2009-2012 
period in each hospital, apart from a slight decrease for H2 
in 2012. Both H3 and H4 show slowly increasing spikes from 
2009 to 2011, followed by a much steeper increase from 2011 
to 2012, particularly for H4.
This practice was only observable in H4. In 2012, 24% of 
Table 2. Distribution and Characteristics of ED Target Implementation Case Study Interviews
ED Clinicians
ED Clinician-
Managers
ED Managers
Inpatient 
Clinicians
Inpatient Clinician-
Managers
Hospital/Organisational 
Managers
Total
Hospital 1 5 1 2 6 1 1 16
Hospital 2 2 1 2 4 2 7 18
Hospital 3 6 1 1 5 1 3 17
Hospital 4 3 2 3 5 1 3 17
Total 16 5 8 20 5 14 68
Round 1 (2011) 11 4 4 13 5 10 47
Round 2 (2012) 5 1 4 7 0 4 21
Abbreviation: ED, emergency department.
Table 3. Changes in Target Performance in Case Study Sites
Performance on Target Measure Prior 
to Implementation (April-June 2009) 
(Ministry of Health Figures)
Performance on Target 
Measure for October – 
December 2012)38
Growth in ED Presentations38 
2009-2012
Estimated Cost of ED Target 
Implementation Per ED 
Presentation (2009-2012)39
Hospital 1 80.7% 94.9% Low (<10%) $6.44
Hospital 2 78.7% 96.2% High (>15%) $15.14
Hospital 3 62.6% 84.8% High (>15%) $17.42
Hospital 4 55.5% 97.8% High (>15%) $32.32
Abbreviation: ED, emergency department.
TDBP of ‘0’ at 360 minutes 
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Figure 1. TDPB of ‘0’ at 360 Minutes in Case Study Hospitals 2009-2012. 
Abbreviation: TDPB, terminal digit preference bias.
all ED patients in H4 had a recorded ED LOS of less than 
15 minutes (see Figure 3). This practice made it significantly 
easier for H4 to meet the 95% target by inflating the overall 
number (the denominator) of patients recorded as passing 
through ED. The data presented in this figure include a small 
amount of patients that were redirected to alternative acute 
care providers prior to assessment, but still counted for target 
purposes.
Our answers to the first 2 research questions on the 
extent and variation in gaming over time and place are 
summarised in Table 4. We have divided the table into 2 
parts corresponding to early and late implementation. In the 
early phase of implementation, gaming behaviours were most 
extensive in H1 and H2, but by the later period (2011-2012), 
H4 joined H1 as the most prominent gaming site.
Case Study Interview Data
We now turn to the interview data collected at the time of 
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target implementation to help explain why gaming increased 
over time in all sites, and why it was highest in H1 and H4. This 
is a puzzle because these sites were opposite in every respect 
in terms of the contextual data (population size, growth in 
ED presentations, amount spent on target implementation, 
official target performance) reported in Tables 1 and 3. 
Hospital 1
In this case site, pressure to meet the target was intense and 
Spikes at 346-360 minutes for admitted patients 
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Figure 2. Height of Spikes for 346-360 Minutes in Case Study Hospitals 2009-
2012 (Admitted Patients).
Figure 3. Percentage of Admitted Patients With 0-15 Minutes ED LOS. Abbreviation: 
ED LOS, ED lengths of stay.
Spikes at 0- 15 minutes for admitted patients 
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Table 4. Variation in Extent of Gaming Across Time and Case Study Sites
Early implementation (2009-2010)
Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital 4
Official target performance Relatively high Relatively high Low Low
Gaming Indicators
TDPB ‘0’ at 360-369 High Moderate Low Low
Spike 346-360 Moderate Moderate Low Low
Spike 0-15 None None None None
Late implementation (2011-2012)
Official target performance Achieved Achieved Not achieved Achieved
Gaming Indicators
TDPB ‘0’ at 360-369 Very High Moderate Moderate Very High
Spike 346-360 Very High Moderate Moderate Moderate
Spike 0-15 None None None Very High
Abbreviation: TDPB, terminal digit preference bias.
focused tightly on the ED rather than the wider hospital. 
From 2009, a new Chief Executive of the DHB responsible 
for H1 was strongly focused on the ED target. Early strategies 
focused on using existing space in the ED, and creating new 
spaces to decant patients on their way to inpatient wards. The 
CEO exerted considerable direct pressure on ED medical and 
nursing staff.41
Interviewees at this site described a range of gaming 
behaviours. One staff member described ‘clock-stopping’ 
behaviour - the falsifying the record of time of departure from 
ED as follows:
“…the decision to discharge or transfer the patient had 
been made but the patient was taken off the acute [ED target] 
stream before they were moved from the unit” (Hospital 1, 
Round 1, Participant C).
Respondents also described two strategies which involved 
decanting patients to parts of the hospital outside the target 
stream. One of these was within the ED itself.
“We did create 4 ED observation beds in the assessment 
unit…they’re managed by the emergency team. And patients 
who you want to keep an eye on them overnight; and they 
don’t need to be admitted medically, they’re put into our 
ED observation – they’re admitted patients, um, but they’re 
managed by the emergency team. As soon as they are 
admitted into the system as an ED obs patient, then they 
come off the target” (H1, R1, Participant D).
This created the opportunity for gaming as described by 
another respondent:
“I also cover the acute assessment unit so we find that 
sometimes the AAU [acute assessment unit] is a dumping 
ground for people because the 6 hours target’s coming; we’ve 
got to put them somewhere so we’ll just quickly move them 
to another area. So we think that that’s not quite meeting the 
target, but it’s just moving them out of one area to another” 
(H1, R1, Participant A).
From 2011 onwards, ED staff in H1 began to move surgical 
patients to the acute assessment unit within the ED in order to 
stop the clock. For example, if a patient came in at 10 pm they 
would stay in the ED until nearly 4 am, then they would be 
transferred to the AAU because there were no surgical clinical 
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registrars working overnight. 
Hospital 2
H2 was one of the first hospitals to respond to the target. 
This site quickly developed a ‘whole of hospital’ strategy to 
reduce ED waiting times from 2008 (when the organisation 
instituted its own 6-hour target). This site established a whole-
of-hospital target governance group as well as an operational 
group consisting of senior clinical leaders across the hospital. 
Specific initiatives undertaken included the introduction of a 
discharge ward in the surgical unit, a new hospital operations 
management unit, and ‘cohorting’ of patient groups in wards 
designed to improve staff and bed utilisation.
This whole of hospital strategy was recognised by many 
respondents, including those on the frontline:
“I can’t help but think part of the success is, has been, 
the organisational involvement, you know, because we’ve 
struggled with this for so many years from ED, real, 
just ground level, and I think the real success is having 
an organisation that really embraces it a bit” (H2, R1, 
Participant G).
Interviews with staff at H2 also provided clear evidence of 
clock-stopping, described here as ‘falling off the screen’ and 
‘black holes.’
“[The nurses] they’ll say to me is that patient not up yet 
[on the ward]? And they go “we’ve rung them [ED] they 
haven’t come back to us” so I don’t know where the patient is 
or what. Then it’s the whole information screen thing where 
they fall off the screen and I go if they’ve fallen off the screen 
they must be on their way, and there’s that black hole from 
when the patient sort of leaves ED before they get here” (H2, 
R1, Participant I).
This behaviour was attributed to pressure from hospital 
management. According to one respondent, frontline staff 
engaged in gaming, even though they were uncomfortable 
with it.
“If a patient is coming close to their 6 hour mark the, you 
know the Charge Nurses come out, the managers come out, 
the doctors get a rark up, a lot of the time we’re just waiting 
on patient to go up to the ward, so the patient will be scanned 
out of the department before they reach the 6 hour mark even 
if they haven’t actually physically left the department, which, 
I actually find quite unsafe and I don’t like that practice but, 
that’s what the Charge Nurses do” (H2, R1, Participant L).
Hospital 3
This hospital struggled to progress towards the ED target 
throughout the 2009-2012 period. Participants thought that 
the target was primarily framed as an ED responsibility rather 
than focus of the whole of hospital or whole of organisation. 
According to one ED clinician:
“Because it was called an ED target, I think it’s kind of 
branded as we own it, and so that has, that has resulted in 
some of that resistance from the rest of the organisation...I’ve 
sat here with the clinical director from paediatrics and he 
said to me it’s your target, you guys made the decision that 6 
hours was the timeframe” (H3. R1, Participant C).
As with the other sites, clock-stopping behaviour was 
identified.
“So there was things like – right take that patient off the 
board – they’re about to go to the ward and I’m just waiting 
for the attendant, but take them off, you know. And 20 
minutes later it’s like this patient’s still here. Oh well the 
attendant hasn’t arrived” (H3, R1, Participant K).
Interviewees in H3 regarded the opening of new ED and 
short-stay facilities in 2011 as the best opportunity to improve 
target performance. From the second round of interviews, 
there was a continued struggle to gain buy-in and momentum 
on the target contributed to by the multiplicity and complexity 
of medical specialty service and professional groups, as well 
as persistent issues regarding hospital leadership. As such, 
implementation still defaulted to the ED. 
Interviewees described moving patients from the ED to a 
SSU for medical patients in order to avoid target breaches. 
According to a Senior Medical Officer, pressure to game 
increased after 2011:
 “… there’s possibly one thing that’s changed since the last 
time we spoke is the little bit more pressure to game, but only 
on a subtle thing, mainly on use of short stay and observed 
spaces…. I mean that’s just a manifestation of the pressure 
that we’re under to achieve it” (H3, R2, Participant H).
However there was some clinician resistance to this pressure 
to game. One participant, who described the clock-stopping 
behaviour in relating to patients admitted to wards, went on 
to say.
“You know, things like that; so there was a little bit of 
fudging which I didn’t agree with and I had great difficulty 
with and that’s probably when I started to say things like stuff 
the target, you know – we need to know who is here, so don’t 
take them off ” (H3, R1, Participant K).
Hospital 4
In H4, a new, expanded ED facility, with associated SSU 
capacity, opened in early 2011. Performance against the target 
remained low until this point in time. In common with all 
other sites, clock-stopping was identified in H4.
 “[Interviewer: What do you mean by fudging?] Well they’ll 
move patients before they’ve actually gone and that will stop 
the clock, you see. Or, they’ll take people off the computer 
before they’ve been discharged because they’re intended to go 
but they’re waiting for an ambulance but they’re still under 
our care” (H4, R1, Participant B).
Respondents in round 1 also commented on the lack of 
leadership and engagement from senior managers, and a 
lack of support for frontline implementation of the target. 
However, from 2011 target implementation became a priority 
across the whole organisation, and senior leadership and 
support was clearly visible at the frontline. One respondent 
described this change:
“And the other thing I think that’s really made a big 
contribution is better engagement from the organisation. 
The organisation at the top…we hadn’t moved [into the 
new department], so even at that point and the 6 months 
prior to that there wasn’t the engagement at the top” (H4, R2 
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Participant D).
In the second round of interviews, it was clear that the 
availability of the SSU (referred to as the Alpha ward) was 
playing a significant part in target implementation:
“Respondent: Oh, well of course that [the Alpha ward] 
that’s helped immensely because it’s somewhere that you can 
send your patients to, so um the patients that need med, surg, 
ortho gynae input so it might be a patient that needs to go to 
a ward, but there isn’t a ward bed available and then by way 
of preventing a breach, you can move them into the Alpha 
ward” (H4, R2, Participant D).
Table 5 provides a synthesis of the qualitative data in terms 
of the motivation, opportunities and means.
Discussion
Taken together, the data on gaming indicators and interview 
extracts demonstrate that clinicians and managers in all sites 
developed gaming behaviours and strategies in response to 
the ED target. Here we bring together these data in order 
to understand how variation can be explained in terms of 
motivations, opportunities and means (research question 3). 
Opportunities to Game Were the Same Across All Sites
Our qualitative data conclusively confirmed that gaming 
behaviour was clearly detected in all sites. Our interviews 
provided accounts of how it happened. Respondents from all 
sites described clock-stopping behaviour in which patients 
were recorded as having left the ED even though they 
remained in the ED. Operational staff recorded both the time 
of arrival and the time of departure from ED for each patient, 
providing substantial opportunity for data manipulation. A 
further opportunity for data manipulation occurred after 
data collection and prior to DHBs submitting figures to the 
Ministry of Health. There was no system of independent audit 
of ED length-of-stay data, ensuring that any fabrication of 
data would not be discovered. 
The Means to Game Developed Over Time
All sites also reported the practice of transferring patients to 
SSUs (or the AAU in the case of H1) or inpatient wards in 
order to avoid target breaches. Our ED LOS data shows that 
this practice increased over time.
During the implementation period, 3 of the 4 sites (H2, H3, 
and H4) acquired increased capacity to decant patients to an 
SSU. Increases in gaming in H3 and H4 occurred after the 
opening of expanded EDs and associated additional capacity 
in SSUs in early 2011. The increase was more marked in H4 
because its SSU covered all patients, whereas it was only 
used for medical patients in H3. The same increase occurred 
earlier in H2.
In contrast, H1 engaged in significant gaming even though 
the availability and capacity of destinations for decanting 
patients was limited to a small number of beds in an ED 
acute assessment unit, and corridors in inpatient wards. 
The differences in capacity to decant patients matches the 
differences in resources allocated to ED target implementation 
in the last column of Table 1. Therefore it is plausible to 
suggest that H1 relied more heavily on gaming behaviours 
such as moving patients to ward corridors because it had less 
capacity to increase levels of staff and beds. In all other sites, 
higher levels of gaming were associated with greater available 
capacity to decant patients.
Motivation to Game Varied Across the Sites
The sites with the highest levels of gaming, H1 and H4, 
were very different, even opposite, to each other in terms of 
organisational dynamics and motives. High levels of gaming 
were highly dependent on contextual factors. In H1 it was 
the downward pressure on ED staff from senior management 
which caused frontline staff to resort to the only means at 
their disposal – placing patients in ward corridors, decanting 
to inpatient wards and the AAU and/or taking ED patients 
‘off the screen.’ 
Table 5. Variation in Motivation, Opportunities and Means of Gaming Across Time and Sites
Early implementation (2009-2010)
Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital 4
Motivation
High pressure on ED from senior 
leadership
Whole of organisation approach to 
ED target, management pressure on 
clinical staff
Target is ED’s problem
 Intermittent pressure from 
leadership
Some clinical resistance to 
pressure to game
Lack of senior leadership on target 
implementation, little pressure on ED
Opportunities All sites report ‘clock-stopping’ and ‘patients disappearing from screen’
Means
Decant to Acute Assessment Unit 
and/or ward corridors
Decant to ED SSU and/or wards
Decant to ED SSU (medical only) 
and/or wards
Decant to ED SSU and/or wards
Late implementation (2011-2012)
Motivation
High pressure on ED staff from senior 
leadership which views target as an 
important priority
Whole of organisation approach to 
ED target, management pressure on 
clinical staff, moderate alignment of 
target with organisational perception 
of problem
Target is ED’s problem
 Intermittent pressure from senior 
leadership, clinical resistance to 
gaming pressure, low alignment 
with organisational challenges
Whole of organisation approach to ED 
target, moderate alignment of target with 
organisational perception of problem
Opportunities All sites report ‘clock-stopping’ and ‘patients disappearing from screen’
Means
Decant to Acute Assessment Unit 
and/or ward corridors
Decant to ED SSU and/or wards
Decant to ED SSU (medical only) 
and/or wards
Decant to ED SSU and/or wards
GP referrals straight to SSU
Abbreviations: ED, emergency department; SSU, short-stay unit.
Tenbensel et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, 9(4), 152–162160
Conversely, high levels of gaming in H4 emerged as an 
artefact of senior management’s ‘whole-of-hospital’ strategies 
to meet the target. These included expanding the scope for 
very short ED LOS, and utilising availability of a new SSU to 
manage patient flow between the ED and the inpatient wards. 
The decision to classify general practitioner-referred patients 
as part of the target denominator (the 0-15 minute spike) was 
a strategic rather than an operational decision. 
H3 also offers an interesting contrast to H1. H3 was also was 
characterised by an ED-focused approach to implementation, 
but gaming behaviour was at lower levels. This was the site 
where official target performance was comparatively poor. 
Compared to other sites, senior management did not place 
as much pressure on ED staff to meet the target, and ED staff 
appeared less willing to falsify the data. 
Another clear finding is that gaming was more prevalent 
the closer organisations were to reaching the target. Contrary 
to our expectations from the literature,42 poor performance in 
the early period in H3 and H4 was associated with low levels 
of gaming, whereas the better performing sites (H1 and H2) 
gamed more. Gaming increased in H3 and H4 only once new 
facilities had opened in 2011. 
Overall, while the motivations to game were highly context 
specific across the sites, the strategic behaviour of senior 
management was a common factor, even though the details 
of this strategic behaviour varied substantially. Gaming 
was induced or initiated by the actions of senior managers. 
As such, accounts of motivation that emphasise the moral 
attributes of frontline clinicians are not a major factor driving 
the variation in gaming behaviour. The only location in which 
knightly or knavish behaviour might have affected rates of 
gaming was in H3 in which clinicians resisted the (weaker) 
management pressure at that site.
Conclusion
Our aim in this paper is to open up the questions of how and 
why gaming varies across time and place in order to inform 
discussions about how to minimise gaming of ED targets, and 
performance management regimes in health more generally. 
Our findings are themselves bound by time and place, as 
they are predominantly from larger, urban hospitals. We also 
acknowledge that the data is over seven years old, and that 
some important features regarding ED LOS data capture, 
gaming, and the evolution of service delivery in hospitals, 
may have changed the ED target landscape after 2012. 
However, our key aim was to provide more fine-grained 
analysis of the ways in which gaming behaviour emerges and 
evolves in specific organisational contexts in the first years of 
implementation. This is an approach can be readily applied 
to researching the implementation of any performance 
management regime. Gaming behaviours are not static, and 
are subject to local, contextual influences. 
With this in mind, we offer three starting points for 
minimising the gaming of performance management. 
1)	 The most straightforward way to prevent gaming of 
targets is to ensure that there are no opportunities to 
game.1 In the case of the SSED target, we are confident 
that gaming was an inevitable consequence of policy 
design in which there was no independent system of 
monitoring and verification. If policy-makers choose not 
to eliminate opportunities to game, they need to focus on 
mitigating means and motivation.
2)	 The SSED story is consistent with literature on the 
life cycle of performance measures, particularly the 
argument that performance measures ‘wear out’ over 
time.19,43 If organisations acquire the means to game, then 
one response is to develop systems to detect and monitor 
the emergence of gaming.19 Monitoring and providing 
feedback on spikes and TDPB is a practical and easily 
implemented response. If targets show signs of wearing 
out after 2-3 years, then some adaptation of measures is 
advisable.
3)	 In order to address and minimise motivation to game, 
custodians of performance management systems should 
pay attention to the strategies of senior management. 
These strategic responses differed markedly between 
the organisations that gamed the most. These responses 
mattered more than the motivations of frontline 
clinicians. The challenge is to understand the interplay 
between the problem perceptions and priorities of 
external actors and organisations (in this case the 
Minister and Ministry), senior organisational managers, 
and front-line staff,25,26,28 and how these map on to local 
patterns of service demand, configuration of services and 
resourcing decisions. 
There is a broader question of whether or not gaming is a 
necessary evil to be tolerated to some degree in the pursuit 
of improved health service outcomes and processes. Other 
research into New Zealand’s ED target demonstrated that 
there were clear benefits for patients attributable to the target’s 
introduction44 which were likely to be because of improved 
patient flow.38 It is unlikely that these benefits would have 
been achieved without the ED target.
However, these improvements were manifest in the first 
18 months of implementation, before gaming behaviour 
intensified.38 As time went on, the adverse consequences of 
gaming such as loss of staff morale, weakening of intrinsic 
motivation, and declining trust in the veracity of performance 
data, became increasingly problematic.10 As such, the balance 
between benefits and dysfunctional effects of the ED target 
changed over time. Arguably, it is easier for organisations 
to game than to change entrenched culture attitudes and 
behaviour. It is unreasonable to expect that an ED LOS target, 
by itself, can induce the changes of organisational culture and 
hospital practice that are necessary to address systemic access 
block. But if we understand how and why gaming intensifies 
at certain times or in particular places, it may be possible to 
detect it earlier and develop responses that reap the benefits of 
an ED target while minimising dysfunctional consequences 
of gaming.
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